The relationship between Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain has been a subject of significant interest and shifting dynamics over the past five years, especially following the historic Abraham Accords. These agreements, signed on September 15, 2020, initially fueled hopes for a new era of regional cooperation and normalization. However, the journey has been far from smooth, and the actual trajectory reveals complexities that often go unnoticed. Now, more than five years later, and two years into the regional upheaval triggered by the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, the future of these alliances remains uncertain.
But here's where it gets controversial: despite formal diplomatic ties and burgeoning security and economic cooperation, these relationships have been severely tested by regional tensions, policy disagreements, and shifting public opinions. So, what exactly is the current state of these relations, and what challenges and opportunities lie ahead?
To understand this, we dive into detailed conversations with a wide spectrum of insiders—Emirati and Bahraini analysts, regional diplomats, and Gulf-based Western observers—whose insights are kept confidential due to the sensitive nature of the issues at hand. Their perspectives paint a nuanced picture of a fragile but resilient alliance.
The Early Days: A Brief Honeymoon
Initially, the process of normalization was hailed as a breakthrough, but it was hardly friction-free. The UAE, eager to attract Israeli investments, faced obstacles from Israeli regulators and public opinion. Furthermore, Israel's policies in the West Bank and Jerusalem—especially actions taken around the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif—became points of contention, contradicting the 'tolerance' narrative that the Accords aimed to promote. This tension was magnified by the election of Benjamin Netanyahu’s most right-wing government in December 2022. The annual Negev Summit, a gathering of foreign ministers from Israel, Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, the UAE, and the U.S., scheduled as a key fixture to bolster regional cooperation, was postponed indefinitely in 2023, signaling waning enthusiasm.
Interestingly, while diplomatic visits like Netanyahu’s to the UAE or Bahrain did not materialize, military cooperation persisted behind the scenes, illustrating that strategic interests often outweigh public disagreements.
Post-October 7: New Challenges and Solidarity
The attack on October 7 dramatically reshaped the regional landscape. While the UAE and Bahrain did not publicly support Hamas, both governments expressed deep empathy for the plight of Gazans and reaffirmed their commitment to the Palestinian cause. Previously, these states justified their engagement with Israel as a way to protect Palestinian interests—UAE officials, for example, claimed that the Abraham Accords helped prevent Israeli annexation plans in the West Bank. The UAE also sent over $2.27 billion in humanitarian aid to Gaza, including medical supplies, field hospitals, and desalination units.
However, analysts within the Gulf express frustration, suggesting that Israeli policies often ignore Gulf interests and take their cooperation for granted. An Emirati researcher remarked that Israel treats the Accords as a matter of convenience rather than mutual investment, raising questions about their long-term sustainability.
In terms of public opinion, the situation varies. Emiratis, who largely support normalization at the governmental level, tend to be less interested in personal engagement with Israel, a sentiment that has grown more pronounced since October 2023. Business and individual relationships are often avoided due to reputational concerns and emotional ties to Palestinian suffering. Bahrain’s public sentiment shows even greater discontent; with political views more openly expressed, opposition to normalization has soared from around 85% before October 7 to approximately 95% afterward. Many Bahrainis feel the depth of normalization is superficial, lacking concrete economic or security benefits, especially given the minimal Israeli presence in Bahrain.
Tensions Over Annexation and Regional Stability
Concerns regarding Israeli plans for partial annexation of West Bank territories—particularly Netanyahu’s flirtation with this idea during 2025—sparked diplomatic alarms. The UAE publicly declared that annexation would be a 'red line,' jeopardizing the entire regional cooperation project. Emirati officials emphasized that such moves threaten the possibility of a two-state solution and could destroy the principles underpinning the Abraham Accords.
Contrary to Israeli perceptions, Gulf states view their opposition to annexation as genuine concern, not mere diplomatic posturing. Gulf diplomats underscore that preventing annexation was a core motivation for supporting normalization, and many believe that Israel’s recent actions—especially its military strikes against Hezbollah, Iran, and targets in Syria—are indicative of a preference for force over diplomacy. Israeli conduct has been perceived by Gulf observers as increasingly hegemonic, especially with the far-right’s influence growing within Israel, who appear emboldened to act unilaterally.
These military actions have led to fears of regional destabilization. For instance, following Israeli strikes on Syrian government targets in 2025—part of a series of escalations—many Gulf analysts worry that Iran might either retreat and bolster its military defenses or, conversely, escalate its attacks on Gulf neighbors to regain influence, risking further chaos in a vulnerable region.
A particularly profound concern is that Israel’s perceived military dominance fosters a sense of superiority and impunity, with some Gulf voices describing Israel as a 'regional highwayman' drunk with power. The elites are openly discussing whether the Gulf-UAE relationship with Israel is sustainable, given the apparent security asymmetries and the growing influence of the U.S. and Iran.
The Doha Incident and Its Aftermath
The Israeli attack on Doha, Qatar, in September 2025, marked a turning point. Many Gulf leaders and experts saw it as a stark reminder of regional vulnerabilities—showing how Israel could target a fellow Gulf nation directly, breaking a long-held taboo. The strike resulted in the death of a Qatari policeman, symbolically uniting Gulf states in outrage and deepening fears about regional security.
Following the attack, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) responded with an extraordinary security summit in Doha. Its leaders condemned Israel's actions sharply, asserting that any attack on one GCC member was an attack on all, and called for increased military cooperation and intelligence sharing. However, the true impact of these measures remains to be seen, as the region grapples with what military alliances and collective security actually entail amid ongoing tensions.
The Road Ahead: What May Come?
Despite these tensions, there is little optimism that the UAE or Bahrain will fully sever ties with Israel. Their strategic interests in security, technology, and economic collaboration outweigh the risks. Nonetheless, the decreasing threat perception of Iran—especially as Gulf states have improved relations with Tehran—may lessen the urgency for deep regional integration.
Regional connectivity projects, such as the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), continue to be discussed, emphasizing alternative routes and partnerships that might bypass Israel. Progress here hinges on political will—particularly on Saudi-Israeli normalization—which remains a contentious and challenging hurdle due to rising geopolitical costs.
Another obstacle is the reluctance of Arab governments to admit mistakes, especially given the political and diplomatic costs of retracting from the Abraham Accords. Significant support within the U.S. Congress—especially among pro-Accord factions—also discourages a quick reversal of these policies, as they view the Accords as a major diplomatic achievement.
Looking forward, the prospect of a return to earlier levels of cooperation between Israel and Gulf states seems distant, especially with the current Israeli government's perceived weakness and controversial stance on the Palestinian issue. Many experts believe that major shifts will only occur after Israeli elections, and even then, the support for a two-state solution in the Gulf remains uncertain. The regional landscape continues to fluctuate, and the relations are increasingly viewed through a cautious, pragmatic lens—balancing interests, security concerns, and regional identities.
In the end, the question remains: can Gulf-Israeli relations recover their initial promise, or are we witnessing the beginning of a more complicated, perhaps more brittle regional order? How do you see the future of these complex alliances? Will regional tensions deepen, or can diplomacy prevail? Share your thoughts in the comments.
